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ABSTRACT
Using an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve model with a government budget
constraint we demonstrate that greater economic independence of the central bank reduces
inFlation persistence. The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. The
economic independence of the central bank is identical to the degree of monetary
dominance, which in turn reflects the fraction of the nominal budget deficit financed by
issuing bonds. The greater this fraction the lower the implied monetary accommodation of
government budget deficits. With rational wage-setters anticipating lower monetary
accommodation, expected inflation will be lower. The lower expected inflation results in
lower wages and prices, with the net outcome being lower inflation persistence. This
result stresses conclusions of recent research that monetary regimes matter not only for
the average inFlation rate, but for the persistence of inflation as well.1
I INTRODUCTION t~
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin in the
monetary policy credibility literature (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon
(1983), Rogoff (1985) and Cukierman (1992)). As Rogoff (1985) notes, dynamic
inconsistency theories of inflation of the Barro-Gordon (1983) type, make it plausible that
countries with independent central banks have a lower sustainable rate of inflation.
Unlike the well-developed theoretical literature, there are only a few studies that
compare actual monetary regimes between a large number of countries. The most
comprehensive studies are Fair (1980), Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989),
Alesina and Summers (1990), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) (GMT) and ~
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993).
GMT compare the monetary regimes of eighteen industrial countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New-Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States) during the post-war period by focusing on political and economic independence of
the central bank.
According to GMT, political independence is the capacity to choose the final goals of
monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of economic activity. I-Ience this concept is
associated with the subjective tradeoffs of the central bank and of political authorities
between price stability and other goals such as high employment2).
On the other hand, GMT identify economic independence with the nature of the
monetary instruments under the control of the central bank (such as the discount rate or
the ability to conduct open market operations) and with the influence of the government in
determining how much to borrow from the central bank. They point out that if the
government can influence the quantity and the conditions at which it borrows from the
central bank, it also influences the creation of the monetary base. Hence, the greater the
government influence on the monetary financing of the budget deficit, the smaller the
u The author is grateful for helpful comments by Geert Almekinders, Rcel Beetsma, Lans Bovenberg,
Matthew Canzoneri, Sylvester Eijffinger, Casper van Ewijk, Frank de Jong, Theo van de KlundeR,
Rick van der Plceg, Martin van Tuijl, and an anonymous referee on previous drafts of this paper. Of
course, the usual disclaimer applíes. Earlier versions were presented at the Siath Congress of the
European Economic Association August 31-September 2, 1991 Cambridge U.K. and at the Inter-
national Symposium on Economic Modelling, University of Góteborg, Sweden 18-20 August 1992.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully
acknowledged.
2~ For an in-depth discussion of politicalindependence and the various associated indices of central bank independence sae Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Dz Haan and Sturm (1992).2
economic independence of the central banlc;l.
This latter aspect of the domestic monetary regime seems particularly relevant for
less developed countries with poorly developed financial markets. For instance, in the
1980s monetary financing of budget deficits was common practice in Southern-European
countries like Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. This had much to do with the less-
developed financial markets in the "olive-belt". See De Grauwe and Papademos (1990)
and Eijffinger and Gerards (1991).
GMT establish an index of economic independence which is then compared with the
average inflation rate over the period 1950-1989. For the period of the study e.g. West
Germany, Switzerland, the U.S. and Austria were associated with high economic
independence whilst the central banks of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain indeed had
very little economic independence. By and large, the greater the economic independence
of the central bank the lower the average inflation rate. Thus GMT find empírical
evidence that the domestic monetary regime matters for the average inflation rate.
Moreover, as noted by Cukierman (1992, chapter XV) inflation is usually a fairly
persistent process, i.e. if inflation becomes unusually high, it dces not quickly revert to
its earlier level, and the same is true if it becomes abnormally low. Recent research by A-
logoskoufis and Smith (1991) and by Alogoskoufis (1992a) demonstrates that fixed
exchange-rate regimes like the international gold standard and the Bretton-Woods gold
dollar standard appear to be associated with negligible persistence of inflation, while
regimes of managed exchange rates are associated with very high inflation persistence.
They propose that the higher inflation persistence is the result of the higher monetary and
exchange-rate accommodation of price changes in flexible exchange-rate regimes. Hence,
Alogoskoufis and Smith find empirical evidence that exchonge-rate regimes matter for the
persistence of inflation.
In this paper we demonstrate that low inflation persistence may also be achieved by
setting up centra] banks that are independent from government influence on monetary
financing of budget deficits. Hence we provide theoretical arguments that the domestic
monetary regime matters for the persistence of inflation. We use an expectations-augmen-
ted Phillips curve model with a government budget constraint to suggest that the lower
inflation persistence is the result of lower monetary accommodation of government budget
deficits.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section II we introduce the government budget
constraint. In section III we incorporate this constraint into a simple IS-LM based
aggregate demand schedule. The supply side of the model viz. a Lucas surprise supply
function is introduced in section IV, By equating the aggregate demand and supply
schedules, in section V we derive a closed form solution for expected inflation. From this
3j GMT focus on internal monetary policy, i.e. they take no account of the relations of governments and
central banks in the conduct of exchange rate policy.3
solution we derive an inverse relationship between the degree of economic independence
and the persistence of inflation. That is, an increase in the degree of economic indepen-
dence of the central bank will result in a decrease in the degree of persistence of inflation.
A summary and questions for further research can be found in section VI.
II THE DYNAMICS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
In this section we introduce the government budget constraint that links monetary and
fiscal policy. We show that the fraction of the budget deficit financed by money is
identical to the degree of fiscal dominance, i.e. the extent to which the burden of
satisfying the government's budget constraint falls on the central bank. Conversely, it is
shown that the degree of monetary dominance, i.e the extent to which the burden of
satisfying the government budget constraint falls on the treasury, may be interpreted as
the economic independence of the central bank.
11.1 Monetary versus Bond Financing
In order to simplify the algebra at a later stage of the analysis we abstract from
interest payments on government bonds. Under these assumptions the consolidated
government-central bank period-by-period (Flow) budget constraint is
OB
~IVIt t (-)t - gt13t
i
where superscript " denotes absolute values.
This difference equation asserts that the primary nominal budget deficit gp must be
financed either by creating money ~M, or by selling bonds to the private sector.
g is the number of outstanding bonds which have infinite lives (perpetuities) paying one-
unit coupon.4j Hence the market value of the stock of bonds will be (B~t, where f is
the interest rate. t
Note that the bond term on the lefthandside of the government budget constraint is
the change in the market value of the stock of bonds including capital gains or losses on
pre-existing bonds. As shown by e.g. Stevenson et a1. (1988, pp. 7-8) such interest rate
valuation effects on the bond stock can be argued to have a certain macroeconomic
significance. However, in this paper such valuation effects have no critical role to play
and for the remainder of the analysis, we shall assume, for simplicity, that the value of
the bond stock is unaffected by interest rate changes, and can be measured by
4~ The government (the treasury) finances its deficit by bond sales. The difference between total bonds
sold and private bond sales consists of bonds sold to the central bank. The central bank pays for its
bonds purchases by creating money which ends up in the private sector. For a lucid exposition see
Miller (1983).4
B` , that is, the number of bonds evaluated at a constant interest rate.
i 0
Taking account of these considerations we can rewrite the government budget
constraint as
2.1 OBt ( ) AMt ` - ' gtPt
to
Equation (2.1) is similar to Turnovsky's (1977, p. 70) treatment of the early theory of the
government budget constraint. This theory was pioneered by Christ (1967, 1968) and
subsequently developed by e.g. Blinder and Solow (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1981)
and Buiter (1988)5).
Introducing F for nominal financial wealth and normalizing ?o at unity, (2.1) can be
rewritten as the system
(2.2)
(2.3)
OFt - 8c ~t
Ft-Mt}Bt
Log-linearizing (2.2) and (2.3) around a path of steady growth yields
(2.4)
(2.5)
o ft - ti(gt t pt)
ft - (1 - ~o)mt } ~obt
where lower-case letters without "hats" refer to logarithmic deviations from steady growth
valuesb), y is the steady growth rate (of all variables) on the reference path and 4,o is the
initial share of bonds in financial
wealth Bo
Fo
Thus f is nomina] financial wealth, g the real primary deficit (net of interest payments), p
the price level, m the nominal money stock, and b the nominal stock of private bonds (all
measured as deviations from steady growth values). p is the quasi first difference
5~ For an excellent study on the dynamics of growth and government debt including criticism of Blinder
and Solow (1973) see van Ewijk (1989).
6~ t?n the reference path of steady growth for a variable X say, OXtf t~ Xt -~y and x- d f n}C5
operator [(1 f y) - L] and L is the backward shift (lag) operator.~
Upon substituting (2.5) in (2.4) and some rearrangement we get the log-linear version
of the government budget flow constraint (i.e. equation (2.1))
(2.6) ~ mt - Y pt - y gt - ~o (~bt - 1'pt) 1 - ~0 1 - s~o
According to (2.6) given the price level (p), the authorities (i.e. the treasury and the
central bank) have three policy variables private bond sales (pb), monetary policy (pm)
and fiscal policy (g). Any two of these policy variables can be chosen independently.
Thus, given the price level and bond sales to the public, ~m and g are interdependent.
The extent to which (2.6) binds pm given g or vice versa, depends on the way fiscal and
monetary policies are coordinated.
In order to make this more transparent we introduce the concept of monetary
seigniorage (e.g. Klein and Neumann 1990, p. 211).
(2.7) ~ - OMt
ljt
This concept is widely used in empirical research and measures the wealth transfer which
the private sector has to make in order to receive base money from the central bank.g)
Likewise log-linearizing (2.7) yields
(2.8) st - ~mt - ypt
Substituting (2.8) in the government budget constraint (2.6) we end up with
(2.9) st - 1 ry~o gt - 1~o~o (~ bt - tipt)
Equation (2.9) emphasizes the interdependence of seigniorage revenues (s) and the fiscal
deficit (g) given real private bond sales.
l1.2 Coordinaiion of Monetary and Fisca! Policy
~ The quasi first difference operator reduces to the ordinary first difference operator (~ . 1- L) if the
growth rate (y) is zero.
-OB
81 For instance, using (2.3) it can be shown that ~St - ~ t, i.e. for a given stock of real fmancial
t
wealtó increases in real base money require the private sector to sell its govemment securities to the
central bank.6
Following Sargent and Wallace (1984, p. 16)9) we consider two forms of monetary
and fiscal policy coordination. On the one hand, imagine that monetary policy dominates
fiscal policy. Under this coordination scheme, at time t say, the central bank sets
monetary policy by choosing mt. By doing this - given the predetermined money supply at
t- 1 and the price level at time t- the central bank determines the amount of revenue it
will supply the treasury through monetary seignoirage sc. Hence if monetary policy
dominates fiscal policy, the central bank determines the left hand side of equation (2.9).
The treasury then faces the constraints imposed by the private sector demand for bonds
bt, since it must set its deficit gt so that it can be financed by a combination of the
seigniorage determined by the central bank and bond sales to the public.lo)
On the other hand, imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The
treasury sets its deficit gt. Under this second coordination scheme the central bank faces
the constraints imposed by the private sector demand for government bonds for it must
finance with seigniorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the treasury
and the amount of bonds bt that can be sold to the public. Sargent and Wallace point out
that although a central bank might still be able to control inflation permanently, it is less
powerful than a central bank under the first coordination scheme. For if the treasury's
deficit cannot be financed solely by new private bond sales, then the central bank is
forced towards monetary accommodation of the government budget deficit. That is, the
central bank has to absorb the excess supply of treasury bills in exchange for high-
powered money.
Suppose that private bond sales are governed by
(2.10) OB - d3 gt ~t 0 5 d3 5 1 t
Equation (2.10) asserts that a fraction d3 of the nominal budget deficit is financed by
private bond sales, and that the remaining (1 - d3) is financed by "printing" money.
Likewise log-linearizing (2.10) yields
(2.11) ~bt - d~~ (gt t pt)
Substitution of (2.11) into (2.6) yields
(2.12) (1 - d3)y
~ mt - 1 (gt ' Pt)
- ~o
9j Of course the original paper is Sargent and Wallace (1981), we cite the 1984 raprint because it is
more easy to obtain.
~~1 The real private sector demand for bonds depends on the nominal interest rate, on real output, and on
real financial wealth. An explicit expression will be derived in section 111.Equation (2.12) consists of the lagged money supply, and an accommodation
ccefficient (1 - d3) describing the extent to which the money supply accommodates
changes in nominal budget deficits. This equation is analogous to Alogoskoufis' (1992a,
p. 463) parametrization of the international reserve regime.tt~
Hence, the greater the economic independence of the central bank the lower the
degree of monetary accommodation (1 - d3). Conversely, d3 may be interpreted as an
institutional parameter reFlecting the degree of monetary dominance, i.e. the extent to
which the burden of satisfying the government's budget constraint falls on the fiscal
authorities (see Tabellini (1988), Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988)). Figure 1 shows the
relationship between money growth and the nominal budget deficit.
[INSERT FIGURE IJ
From Figure 1 we derive propositions (2.1) and (2.2).
PROPOSITION 2.1: If the central bank is completely dependent - i.e. if d3 - 0- money
growth is completely determined by the nominal deficit. Hence, fiscal policy completely
dominates monetary policy.
PROPOSITION 2.2: If the central bank is completely independent - i.e. if d3 - 1-
money growth is equal to zero. Hence, monetary policy completely dominates fiscal
policy.
To summarize, in equation (2.10) the fraction of the budget deficit that is financed by
private bond sales d3 is identical to the degree of monetary dominance, which in turn
reflects GMT's concept of the economic independence of the central bank. The greater
d3, the greater the economic independence of the central bank. This concludes the section
on the governement buget constraint. We turn next to the description of the demand side
of the model.
III THE DEMAND SIDE
ttl Using the notation of this paper Alogoskoufis' equation is rni -(1 - d3) p~ t~ where ~- N(0,
aZ~. Alogoskoufis characterizes the classical gold standard, and the gold exchange standards of the
interwar period and of Bretton-Woods as low monetary accomodation regimes, and [he rest as high
accomodation regimes.8
In this section we introduce the govemment budget constraint (GBC) into a simple IS-
LM framework. We derive the difference equation describing the dynamics of the system.
By examining this equation we show that if fiscal expansions are completely bond-
financed - i.e. if d3 - 1- the AD impact multiplier of a fiscal stimulus reduces to that
implied by the conventional static IS-LM case.
The GBC in a Simple IS-LM Framework
T'he IS and LM schedules are given by (3.1) and (3.2)
(3.1) y~ - g, - at(i~ - E~pt,t t pt)
(3.2)~ - Pt -Yt - az~
at 1 0
tYZ ~ 0
Equation (3.1) is the savings-investment balance condition. y is the log of aggregate
demand (AD), i is the nominal interest rate and E(.) is the operator of rational expectati-
ons. Equation (3.2) is the money market equilibrium condition (LM curve).12) or2 is the
interest ra[e semi-elasticity of money demand.
The IS-LM model is essentially a two-asset portfoliomodel comprising money and
bonds. From Walras' law the bonds market equilibrium condition is redundant. However,
by substituting equation (3.2) in the definition of financial wealth
(2.5} ft - (1 - ~o) mt f ~o bt
and after some rearrangement we obtain the following expression for the real private
sector demand for bonds.13~
(3.2.b) bt - pt - az(1 -~o) it - 1-~o yt t 1(ft - pt) 0 ~ d,o G 1
~o wo ~o
Hence, the real private sector demand for bonds depends positively on the nominal
interest rate and on real financial wealth and negatively on aggregate demand. Note that
by vitue of the derivation of the demand for bonds equation, the elasticities of the asset
demand system (3.2) -(3.2.b) satisfy the familiar adding-up constraints.
Elimination of the nominal interest rate from (3.1) and (3.2) and setting FtGpttt - 0
Note that nominal money demand dces not depend on ezpected inflation. Hence, unlike Sargent aad
Wallace (1981), we do not require the Cagan (1956) money demand function to obtain our results.
13~ We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.9
gives the aggregate demand (AD) schedulet4)
(3.3) yt - ot(~ - pt) t az g~ where at -~ aá and az - Q a~
t z t z
From (3.3) it can be seen that the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy
depends on the ratio
al al IS)
a2 - a2
Hence, monetary policy is more effective the higher at, (the flatter the IS-curve) and
the lower a2 (the steeper the LM-curve). For instance, if at -~ oo and a2 y 0, we have a
horizontal IS-curve and a vertical LM-curve. In that case monetary policy is completely
effective in boosting aggregate demand whilst fiscal policy is completely ineffective.
Following Argy (1988), p. 148 we label this case "Simplistic Monetarism".
Conversely, fiscal policy is more effective the lower at, (the steeper the IS-curve)
and the higher az (the flatter the LM-curve). If at --~ 0 and az -~ or, we have the
Keynesian liquidity trap: fiscal policy is completely effective whilst monetary policy is
completely ineffective.
Now we combine the GBC with (3.3). Eliminating m from equations (2.6) and (3.3),
we obtain the following difference equation for aggregate demand in terms of the policy
instruments (viz. fiscal policy and private hand sales) and exogenous variables (i.e the
price level),
~t (3.4) p yt - 1 ~1' (gt ' Pt) - wo 0 bt] t az~ gt - a 10 Pt
- ~o
This is a first order difference equation. Hence if we compare equations (3.4) and
(3.3) it becomes immediately clear that the GBC imposes a dynamic structure on the
static IS-LM framework.
However, as shown in section II in equation (3.4) the variable b is not independent
from g 16). For private bond sales are endogenous and governed by the development of
the nominal budget deficit:
ia)
151
Abstracting from a wedge between the real and the nominal intarest rate has the advantage of
simplifying the dynamics of expected inFlation in a latter stage of the analysis. More specific, taking
account of this effect implies that equation (5.2) would be a second-0rder rather than a first-order
ezpectational difference equation. Meaning that it would have one backward and one forward root.
For recent evidence on the associated Monetarist-Keynesian debate of the 1960's and early 1970's
featuring amongst others Friedman and Meiselman (1963), Ando and Modigliani (1965), Anderson and
Jordan (1968) and Blinder and Solow (1974) srz Kretzmer (1992).
tbl We consider the case were b is ezogenous in appendiz A.10
(2.11) 0bt - d~ó (gt } pt)
Equation (2.11) asserts that a fraction d3 of the nominal budget deficit is financed by
issuing bonds, and that the remaining (1 - d3) is financed by printing money.
Hence the demand side of the economy is given by equations (2.11) and (3.4).
Substitution of (2.11) in (3.4) yields the aggregate demand (AD) schedule:
3.5 1 - d a
( ) Óyt -
1-
3~0 t 1'
(gt ` pt) } oZ ~ gt - at ~Pt
Following Turnovsky (1977), pp. 70-73 we now analyse the effects on aggregate
demand of the following policy:
g, ~ 0, g~ - g, t z 1 p constant for all t
This describes a sustained increase in the budget deficit at time 1. A fraction 1-~ of
the deficit is financed by "printing" money (i.e by selling bonds to the central bank), the
remaining ~ is financed by private bond sa]est~.
From (3.5) we obtain a first period multiplier
(3.6) ayt - Q 4 v,(1 - d3)ti ~ 0
agt 2 (1 t y)(1 - ~oo)




As long as d3 x 1 the multiplier dces not equal the expression obtained from the AD
curve. If 0 s d3 s 1, expression (3.6) exceeds the conventional multiplier. This is
because of the thight link between monetary and fiscal policy. An increase in the budget
deficit induces a monetary side effect. The latter effect is absent in traditional IS-LM
models.
Note that if d3 - 1, i.e. if the fiscal expansion is completely bond financed, the
second form at the RHS of (3.6) drops out. Thus complete bond financing yields the usual
result, enabling us to see quite clearly how the conventional multiplier fits into the more
general frameworklg~. This completes the description of the demand side of the model.
t~ In appendiz A we also analyse the effects on aggregate demand of open market operations
(eaogenous changes in b) and of changes in the price level.
~a~ See also the first row of table 1 in appendíx A.11
IV THE SUPPLY SIDE
So far the price level was assumed to be exogenous. In this section we introduce a
simple supply block. Output is being explained by a Lucas surprise supply function. Since
we employ one-period wage contracts policy invariance holds; i.e. output and unemploy-
ment never systematically deviate from their natural rates. By equating the aggregate
demand schedule, i.e. equation (3.5), and the supply schedule, i.e. equation (4.7), in
section V we obtain an expectational difference equation in the price level.
A Simple Natural Rate Block
Consider the following set-up which is a perfect foresight closed-economy version of
Alogoskoufis (1992b). Capital is assumed fixed in the short run, and output is given by a
short-run production function of the following type
(a.l) yt - a tt o ~~ ~ 1
Where y is the log of output, I the log of employment, and a is the exponent of labour
and is less than unityt9~.
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of labour to the real
wage (wt - pt). This yields the following employment function
(4.2) It -- 1 1 a(~,t - pt)
where w is the log of the nominal wage. The nominal wage is set at the end of period t-1
for period t. Thus, we have one-period wage contracts.
Alternatively, we could adopt a staggered contracts specification (Fischer (1977),
Calvo (1983)). However a short-run Phillips curve trade-off - i.e. destruction of the
Sargent and Wallace (1975) policy invariance result - is not a necessary condition for the
results of this paper. Therefore we abstract from overlapping wage contracts. Again, this
has the additional advantage of simplifying expectational dynamics in a later stage of the
analysis.Zo~
Following Alogoskoufis (1992b, p. 7) the objective of wage setters is to stabilize
expected employment during the period of the contract around a target employment level
1. That is, we assume that wages are set by a group of "insiders"ls;, so as to achieve an
employment target Isi which is equal to L Then wages in each period are set to minimize
t91 For simplicity in this model we abstract from stochastic productivity shocks.
'-~l Taking account of overlapping wage contracts implies that equation (5.2) would be a secondorder
rather than a first-0rder ezpectational difference equation. Meaning that it would have two backward
roots instead of one. The latter phenomenon complicates analytical tractability of persistence.12
(4.3) Ec-t (1 - Í)z
where Fi-t(.) denotes the operator of rational expectations, conditional on information
available at the end of period t-1 and ls~ c ls . Thus we employ the insider-outsider
approach to the labour market (Blanchard and Summers (1986), Lindbeck and Snower
(1986)). IS is the log of the labour force. The minimization of (4.3) is subject to the
labour demand function (4.2). From the first-order conditions for a minimum of (4.3)
subject to (4.2), the nominal wage is given by,
(4.4) wt - Ec-tPc - (1 - Q) 1
Equation (4.4) states that wages are set at the end of period t- 1 for period t based on
unions' expectations of the price level in period t.
Substituting (4.4) in the labour demand function we get the following relation
between employment and unanticipated shocks,
(4.5) Ic - 1 f 1 a(pc - Ec-tPc) 1
An unanticipated rise in prices pc - F.c-t pc reduces the real wage, and causes firms to
employ more labour.
Subtracting (4.5) from the labour force I5, using that u- 13 - lc, and adding and
subtracting pc-t~(1 - a), we get the following relation for the short run determination of
unemployment,
(4.6) uc - u- 1 a(~Pc - Ec-t OPc) 1
where u is the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment (ls - 1). Thus (4.6) is the
famous expectations augmented Phillips curve. Unemployment deviates from its equilib-
rium rate only to the extent that there are unanticipated shocks to inFlation. Anticipated
shocks to inflation are reflected in wages (equation (4.4)), and do not affect unemploy-
ment.
Substituting (4.5) in the production function (4.1) we get the following relation
between output and unanticipated shocks
(4.7) Yc - Q 1 f 1 a R(Pc - Ec-t Pc)
Equation (4.7) is the aggregate supply (AS) schedule employed ín the remainder of this
paper.
Denoting the average output level by y, from (4.7) it follows that13
(a.8) y - a 1
Adding and subtracting Q~(1 - Q) pt-t in (a.7) and using (a.8) we get
(a.9) Yc - Y f 1 R a (OPt - Et-t ~Pt)
Equation (a.9) is the famous Lucas (1973) surprise supply function. Unanticipated rises in
inflation causes output to exhibit transitory deviations from its equilibrium or natural rate
y. This completes the description of the supply side of the model.
V CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE
In this section by equating the aggregate demand and supply schedules we derive a
closed form solution for expected inflation. From this solution we derive an inverse
relationship between the degree of economic independence and the persistence of
inflation. That is, an increase in the degree of economic independence of the central bank
reduces inflation persistence.
V.1 A Closed Form Solution for Expected Inflation
We begin by recalling the aggregate demand (AD) and supply schedules (AS) derived
in sections III and IV
AD (3.5 (1 - d3) at y
) 0yt -
1- ip (gt ' Pc) } vz Ogt - at DPt
0
AS (a.7) Yt - Y t 1 ~ a (Pt - Et-t Pt)
In order to derive an expression for the price level we eliminate yt from equations
(3.5) and (a.7) By using the lag operator (L) on (a.7) and noting that L Fz-t Pt - Pc-t `ve
getz t) .
(5.1) Yt-t - Y
Substituting (a.7) and (5.1) in (3.5) yields
(5.2) Pc - az Pt-1 t a3 Et-t Pt f aa zt
Zt~ For a lucid exposition on the solution of ezpectational difference equations (including technical
details on lag and forward operators in rational eapectations models) see Blanchard and Fischer
(1989), PP. 261-266.14
where
az-[(1 - Q)(1 - wo)aty tlaa
a~ ~ [i~(I -wo)(1 t y)y-tlaa
aa -~Q(1 - soo)(1 t y)y-t t( 1 - Q)at{(1 - svo)(1 } y)y-' -(1 - d3)},-t
zc - (1 - Q)[ot(1 - d3)gc ` (1 - ~oo) {vzy-t~gc - y}]
The latter expression only consist of exogenous variables and shocks.
Equation (5.2) is a first-order expectational difference equation which can be solved
rather easily. Taking expectations conditional on information at the end of t- 1 of (5.2)
we get
(5.3 az aa ) Ec-tPc - 1- a pc-t } 1- a Ec-tzc
3 3
Using ~ as short-hand for azl(1 - a~), using the definition of i` and taking first differences
equation (5.3) can be rewritten as
~ (S.aj F.c-t~Pc - 1` ~pc-t - (t - Q)(ly- ~P ) Q
Ec-tOzc
o t
In order to obtain a closed form solution for expected inFlation we need to make
assumptions about the exogenous components that make up z.
Following Alogoskoufis and Smith ( 1991, p.1266) we assume that this component, i.e.
the budget deficit g, is a random walk with drift
(5.5) gc - é' gc t} vg vcg - N(0, vgz)
where g is the average (or expected) rate of growth of the real deficit, and vcg is a white-
noise shock.
From equation (5.5) it follows that
(5.6) pgc - g . vg
and
(5.7) ~gc-t - 8 t vcg-t15
Using (5.6) and (5.7) and noting that Dy - OZZ~ expectations of changes in z are
given by
(5.8) F~-tOzt - (1 - a)[{at(1 - d3) t ( 1 - too) az}g - y-t(1 - ~o)oZ ve~l
Substituting (5.8) in (5.4) we obtain the following closed form solution for expected
inflation
(5.9) Ft-t OPt - 1` ~pt-t } Q (z }~Zt-t)
t
where g- ~(at(1 - dl) }(1 -`~o)a2] g is the drift of the composite z process, and
- ~o
~L ~- aZ vtg is the white-noise process driving it.
One can see that the persistence of inflation ~, is equal to the root of difference
equation (5.3).
V.2 Monetary Accommodation and The Lucas Critique
By using the definitions of a2 and a~ (see equation (5.2)), the root can be expressed
in terms of the structural parameters
(5.10) ~ - 1 - mo
(1 - ~0)(1 ~ y) - ti(1 - d3)
From this expression it can be seen that if d3 ~~o the root is less than unity, and the
difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation (5.3) - is saddlepath stable. In
Appendix B we provide the intuition behind this condition.
Taking the first derivative of i` with respect to the degree of economic independence
d3 we find that it is given by
(s.ll) a~ - wo - 1 ~ o ád, ti[(1 -~vo)(1 t y)ti-' -(1 - d,)]2
From (5.1 t) we derive proposition (5.1).
PROPOSITION 5.1: The higher the economic independence of the central bank - i.e the
higher d3 - the lower the persistence (~) of inflation.
Z2~ Tha natura~ rate of output y- al solely depends on the time-invariant employment target of wage-
setters. Hence DY -o.16
The intuition behind this result may be explained as follows. Consider an exogenous
increase in the real deficit. This is an aggregate demand shock that raises the price level.
Because of both the higher real deficit and the higher price level, the nominal budget
deficit gces up. Under the assumptions of the paper (see equation (2.12)) the higher
nominal deficit raises the money supply, thereby giving another inflationary impulse. The
additional inflationary impulse raises the nominal deficit even further, thereby triggering
additional monetary accommodation. Hence infla[ion persists.
Consider now the role of the central bank. The greater the economic independence of
the central bank d3 , the lower the degree of monetary accommodation (1 - d3) of nominal
budget deficits. Since our model features rational expectations, the rule for the evolution
of the money supply, i.e. equation (2.12), is known. Thus, wage setters form their
expectations of the price level at time t by taking into account equation (2.12). Suppose
the central bank gains more economic independence, i.e. d3 increases. Wage setters
realize that monetary policy becomes less accommodative. With rational wage-setters
anticipating lower monetary accommodation of government budget deficits expected
inflation will be lower. Since future prices are expected to be lower than in the case of
high accommodation, wage contracts will reflect these expectations, and wages will be set
lower than otherwise. The lower wages are reflected through the path of prices, with the
net outcome being lower inflation persistence.
Note that this result is an example of the Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy
evaluation. Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision
rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes
in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in
policy (i.e. a shift in the d3 parameter) will systematically alter the structure of the
econometric model (i.e. the persistence of inflation ~).
By again differentiating (5.11) with respect to dg we find that
(5.12) aZ~ -
2 ( 1 - wo)
~ 0
adj Y[(1 - ~0)(1 ' Y)Y-t - (1 - d~)]3
Since 2ryt(1 -~) ~ 0 we have no points of inflection. Using (5.11) and (5.12) we obtain
Figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
From Figure 2 we derive propositions (5.2) and (5.3).17
PROPOSITION 5.2: If the degree of economic independence of the central bank (d3), is
equal to the initial share of bonds in financial wealth (~o), inflation has a unit root.
PROPOSITION 5.3: If the central bank enjoys full economic independence - i.e. if d3
- 1- the persistence of inflation ~ is at its minimum level ll(1 f y). This level is solely
determined by the monetary growth rate on the reference path.
In the intermediate case (~o c d3 C 1); figure 2 pictures an inverse relationship
between the degree of economic independence and the persistence of inflation. An
increase in the degree of economic independence will result in a decrease of the persisten-
ce of inflation. This result is an example of the famous Lucas critique of econometric
policy evaluation.
VI SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Using an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model with a government budget
constraint we demonstrate that greater economic independence of the central bank reduces
inflation persistence.
The intuition behind this result can be summarized as follows. The economic
independence of the central bank is identical to the degree of monetary dominance, which
in turn reflects the fraction of the nominai budget deficit financed by private bond sales.
The greater this fraction the lower the implied monetary accommodation of government
budget deficits. With rational wage-setters anticipating lower monetary accommodation,
expected inflation will be lower. The lower expected inflation results in lower wages and
prices, with the net outcome being lower inflation persistence.
Thus lower inflation persistence may not only be caused by the exchange-rate regime
as shown by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992a), but also by the
way monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated, i.e. by the domestic monetary regime.
Also our result can be viewed as a dynamic extension of the inverse relationship between
economic independence and the level of inflation found by Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991). We ignored the fact that interest paid on bonds is an expense item in the
govemment's budgetary accounts. Hence, an important extension of the model would be
to allow for this effect. In the presence of interest payments the total budget deficit equals
the sum of the primary deficit and the interest paid on bonds. According to the govern-
ment's budget constraint this total deficit then needs to be financed by a combination of
seigniorage and private bond sales. Now, consider an increase in the economic indepen-
dence of the central bank. The associated fall in seigniorage revenues then implies both
lower monetary accommodation of the primary deficit and lower monetary accommodati-18
on of interest payments on govemment bonds. More specific, the difference with respect
to the analysis in the paper is the fall in monetary accommodation of interest payments.
Therefore the total fall in monetary accommodation following a monetary regime change
will be greater than in the absence of interest payments. Hence, we expect that the
inclusion of this effect will reinforce our results. However we leave a formal proof for
further research.
Finally we sidestepped issues concerning the optimal size of the public sector and the
optimal revenue mix for treasuries and central banks. This is discussed in De Jong and
Van der Plceg (1991) and Van der Piceg (1991). The conclusion of the latter paper is that
in order to assess the case for an independent central bank one should trade-off the
welfare gains associated with enhanced monetary discipline and lower inflation against the
welfare losses associated with a sub-optimal government revenue mix.
APPENDIX A IMPACT AND STEADY STATE MULTIPLIERS UNDER DIFFERENT
INSTITUTTONAL ARRANGEMENTS
In this appendix we complete the analysis of the demand side of the economy as
presented in section III. We analyse the effects on aggregate demand (AD) of open
market operations and of changes in the price level. Also we demonstrate how the impact
and steady-state AD-multipliers of demand and supply shocks relate to those of the
conventional static IS-LM case.
A.1 Open Market Policy
First we analyse the effects on aggregate demand of autonomous changes in b. That
is rather than employing rule (2.11) we now assume that b is a policy instrument of the
central bank, i.e. the central bank may conduct open market operations.
More specific we analyse the effects of the following policy:
bl ~ 0, b~ - b~ t z 1 g~, p~ constant for all t
This represents private sector portfolio substution of money by bonds for a given stock of
financial wealth, i.e. a sustained increase in open market sales of bonds, "paid for" by
decreasing the money supply231.
From (3.4) we obtain a first period multiplier
(A.1)
a yt -- ot~o ~ O
c3 bt 1-~u
~l Turnovsky analyses the effects of a single open market sale.19
Hence, a sustained increase in open market sales of bonds will decrease output. The
reason for this is clear. Consider equation
(2.4) ~ ft - 1'(gt t Pt)
Since ex hypothesi gt and pt constant for all t, the stock of financial wealth dces not
change. This means that open market sales of bonds to the private sector decrease the
amount of base money in the portfolio. Substituting ft - 0 in equation
(2.5) ft - (1 - ~~ tnt } ~o bt
we find that
(A.2)
a mt - - ~o
a bt 1 - ~o
Consequently, the greater the RHS of (A.2) the greater the induced contraction in base
money holdings. The fall in real money balances raises the interest rate and ultimately
decreases output. The latter effect is greater the greater the effectiveness of monetary
policy, i.e. the higher yt in equation (3.3).
A.2 A Shock to the Frice Level
More specific we analyse the effects of the following policy:24)
pt ' 0, pt - pt t 2 1 g, constant for all t
Because of the higher price level the nominal budget deficit increases. The deficit is
financed according to
(2.11) pbt - d?1'(gt t pt) forall t z 1
~o
From the aggregate demand schedule (i.e. equation (3.5) we obtain a first period
multiplier
(A.3) a yt --a t
at ( 1- d3)Y
a Pt ' (1 - ~~(1 ' Y)
Therefore, as long as ~ : 1, the multiplier dces not equal the expression obtained from
the conventional static IS-LM AD schedule (i.e. equation (3.3)). If 0 s d~ s 1 it exceeds
24~ For instance, think about an adverse productivity (or oil) shock that decreases supply and - given
the position of the aggregate demand schedule - raises the price level.20
the conventional expression. The additional
effect ~t (I -~)Y is identical to the one in impact multiplier (3.6).
(I - ~~(1 t Y)
A.3 Impact and Steady-State AD-Multipliers ofDemand and Supply Shocks
Finally, in order to see how the conventional results (viz. equation (3.3)) fit into the
more general dynamic framework employed in section III and in this appendix consider
table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
This table contains the impact and steady-state AD-multipliers under various
institutional arrangements. From this table it follows that if ~- I, i.e. if the central
bank enjoys full economic independence (no monetary financing) the conventional IS-LM
multipliers result. However, if 0 s d3 s 1, the lower the economic independence of the
central bank the higher the impact and steady state multipliers of fiscal policy and supply
shocks.
APPENDIX B SADDLEPATH STABILITY OF EXPECTED INFLATION
In section V.2 it was shown that if
(B.1) d3 ~ ~o
the difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation (5.9) - is saddlepath stable.
In this appendix we provide the intuition behind this condition.ul We show that
expected inflation converges if the wealth elasticity of the private sector demand for
bonds is greater than unity.
In section 2 private bond sales were assumed to be governed by
(2.10) ~Bt - d3gtPt 0 5 d3 5 1
Equation (2.10) asserts that a fraction d3 of the nominal budget deficit is financed by
private bond sales.
By using
(2.2) OFt - gtl~t
'S~ This intuition was suggested to us by [ans Bovenberg.21
and rearranging (2.10) we obtain
(B.2) d3 - ~ B~
0 Fr




(B.3) ~o - Bo
F'o









Hence the difference equation for expected inflation - i.e. equation (5.9) - is
saddlepath stable if the wealth elasticity of the private sector demand for bonds is greater
than unity.
Consider equation
(3.2.b) b~ - p~ - a2(1 - ~o) i - 1 - `~0 1
c Yr `-(fr - pr) 0 C~o c 1
`~o ~o ~o
Hence the wealth elasticity of the private sector demand for bonds equals 1.
~o
Since 0 c~o c 1 condition (BS) holds no matter what parameter values we assume.
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